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Abstract
It has become widely accepted that temporal asymmetry is largely a cosmolog-
ical problem; the task of explaining temporal asymmetry reduces in the main
to that of explaining an aspect of the condition of the early universe. However,
cosmologists who discuss these issues often make mistakes similar to those that
plagued nineteenth century discussions of the statistical foundations of thermo-
dynamics. In particular, they are often guilty of applying temporal ”double
standards” of various kinds—e.g., in failing to recognise that certain statistical
arguments apply with equal force in either temporal direction.
This paper aims to clarify the issue as to what would count as adequate ex-
planation of cosmological time asymmetry. A particular concern is the question
whether it is possible to explain why entropy is low near the Big Bang with-
out showing that it must also be low near a Big Crunch, in the event that the
universe recollapses. I criticise some of the objections raised to this possibility,
showing that these too often depend on a temporal double standard. I also
discuss briefly some issues that arise if we take the view seriously. (Could we
observe a time-reversing future, for example?)
2A century or so ago, Ludwig Boltzmann and others attempted to explain
the temporal asymmetry of the second law of thermodynamics. The hard-won
lesson of that endeavour—a lesson still commonly misunderstood—was that the
real puzzle of thermodynamics lies not in the question why entropy increases
with time, but in that as to why it was ever so low in the first place. To the
extent that Boltzmann himself appreciated that this was the real issue, the best
suggestion he had to offer was that the world as we know it is simply a product of
a chance fluctuation into a state of very low entropy. (His statistical treatment of
thermodynamics implied that although such states are extremely improbable,
they are bound to occur occasionally, if the universe lasts a sufficiently long
time.) This is a rather desperate solution to the problem of temporal asymmetry,
however,1 and one of the great achievements of modern cosmology has been to
offer us an alternative. It now appears that temporal asymmetry is cosmological
in origin, a consequence of the fact that entropy is much lower than its theoretical
maximum in the region of the Big Bang—i.e., in what we regard as the early
stages of the universe.
The task of explaining temporal asymmetry thus becomes the task of ex-
plaining this condition of the early universe. In this paper I want to discuss
some philosophical constraints on the search for such an explanation. In par-
ticular, I want to show that cosmologists who discuss these issues often make
mistakes which are strikingly reminiscent of those which plagued the nineteenth
century discussions of the statistical foundations of thermodynamics. The most
common mistake is to fail to recognise that certain crucial arguments are blind
to temporal direction, so that any conclusion they yield with respect to one
temporal direction must apply with equal force with respect to the other. Thus
writers on thermodynamics often failed to notice that the statistical arguments
concerned are inherently insensitive to temporal direction, and hence unable to
account for temporal asymmetry. And writers who did notice this mistake com-
monly fell for another: recognising the need to justify the double standard—the
application of the arguments in question ‘towards the future’ but not ‘towards
the past’—they appealed to additional premisses, without noticing that in order
to do the job, these additions must effectively embody the very temporal asym-
metry which was problematic in the first place. To assume the uncorrelated
nature of initial particle motions (or incoming ‘external influences’), for exam-
ple, is simply to move the problem from one place to another. (It may look less
mysterious as a result, but this is no real indication of progress. The fundamen-
tal lesson of these endeavours is that much of what needs to be explained about
temporal asymmetry is so commonplace as to go almost unnoticed. In this area
more than most, folk intuition is a very poor guide to explanatory priority.)
One of the main tasks of this paper is to show that mistakes of these kinds
1Not least of its problems is the fact that it implies that all our historical evidence is
almost certainly misleading: for the ‘cheapest’ or most probable fluctuation compatible with
our present experience will always be one which simply creates the world as we find it, rather
than having it evolve from an earlier state of even lower entropy.
3are widespread in modern cosmology, even in the work of some of the con-
temporary physicists who have been most concerned with the problem of the
cosmological basis of temporal asymmetry—in the course of the paper we shall
encounter illicit applications of a temporal double standard by Paul Davies,
Stephen Hawking and Roger Penrose, among others. Interdisciplinary point-
scoring is not the primary aim, of course: by drawing attention to these mis-
takes I hope to clarify the issue as to what would count as adequate cosmological
explanation of temporal asymmetry.
I want to pay particular attention to the question as to whether it is possible
to explain why entropy is low near the Big Bang without thereby demonstrating
that it must be low near a Big Crunch, in the event that the universe recollapses.
The suggestion that entropy might be low at both ends of the universe was made
by Thomas Gold in the early 1960s.2 With a few notable exceptions, cosmolo-
gists do not appear to have taken Gold’s hypothesis very seriously. Most appear
to believe that it leads to absurdities or inconsistencies of some kind. However,
I want to show that cosmologists interested in time asymmetry continue to fail
to appreciate how little scope there is for an explanation of the low entropy Big
Bang which does not commit us to the Gold universe. I also want criticise some
of the objections that are raised to the Gold view, for these too often depend on
a temporal double standard. And I want to discuss, briefly and rather specula-
tively, some issues that arise if we take the view seriously. (Could we observe a
time-reversing future, for example?)
Let me begin with a very brief characterisation of what it is about the early
universe that needs to be explained. There seems to be widespread agreement
about this, so that if what I say is not authoritative, neither is it particularly
controversial.3 The question of the origin of the thermodynamic arrow appears
to come down to that as to why the early universe had just the right degree of
inhomogeneity to allow the formation of galaxies: had it been more homoge-
neous, galaxies would never have formed; had it been less homogeneous, most
of the matter would have quickly ended up in huge black holes. In either case
we wouldn’t have galaxies as the powerhouses of most of the asymmetric phe-
nomena we are so familiar with. For present purposes the latter issue—that
as to why the universe is not less homogeneous—is the more pressing. This is
because, as we’ll see, there are strong arguments to the effect that if the universe
recollapses, the other extremity will be very inhomogeneous. So the homogene-
ity in the region of the Big Bang would appear to represent a stark temporal
asymmetry in the universe as a whole.
The natural mistake
The contemporary cosmological descendant of the problem that Boltzmann was
left with—the problem as to why entropy was low in the past—is thus the
2See Gold (1962) for example.
3There is an excellent account of this in Penrose (1989), ch. 7
4question Why is the universe so smooth near the Big Bang? Now in effect
this question is a call for an explanation of an observed feature of the physical
universe, and one common kind of response to a request for an explanation
of an observed state of affairs is to try to show that ‘things had to be like
that’, or at least that it is in some sense very probable that they should be
like that. In other words, it is to show that the state of affairs in question
represents the natural way for things to be. Accordingly, we find many examples
of cosmologists trying to show that the state of the early universe is not really
particularly special. For example, the following remarks are from one of Paul
Davies’ popular accounts of cosmology and time asymmetry: ‘It is clear that a
time-asymmetric universe does not demand any very special initial conditions.
It seems to imply a creation which is of a very general and random character
at the microscopic level. This initial randomness is precisely what one would
expect to emerge from a singularity which is completely unpredictable.’4
The mistaken nature of this general viewpoint has been ably pointed out
by Roger Penrose, however. Penrose asks what proportion of possible states of
the early universe—what percentage of the corresponding points in the phase
space of the universe—exhibit the degree of smoothness apparent in the actual
early universe. He gives a variety of estimates, the most charitable of which
(to the view that the early universe is ‘natural’) allows that as many as 1 in
1010
30
possible early universes are like this!5
There is another way to counter the suggestion that the smooth early uni-
verse is statistically natural, an argument more closely related to our central
concerns in this paper. It is to note that we would not regard a collapse to a
smooth late universe (just before a Big Crunch) as statistically natural—quite
the contrary, as we noted above—but that in the absence of any prior reason
for thinking otherwise, this consideration applies just as much to one end of the
universe as to the other. In these statistical terms, then, a smooth Big Bang
should seem just as unlikely as a smooth Big Crunch.6
The fact that this simple argument goes unnoticed reflects the difficulty that
we have in avoiding the double standard fallacies in these cases. It deserves more
attention, however. Indeed, its importance goes beyond its ability to counter the
tendency to regard a smooth early universe as ‘natural’, and hence not in need
of explanation. As we shall see, it also defuses the most influential arguments
against Gold models of the universe, in which entropy eventually decreases. It
is common to find considerations concerning gravitational collapse offered as
decisive objections the Gold view. However, what the objectors fail to see is
that if the argument were decisive in one temporal direction it would also be
4Davies (1977), 193-4.
5His most recent estimate is 1 in 1010
120
; see Penrose (1989), ch. 7.
6Penrose himself makes a point of this kind; see Penrose (1989), 339. However, we shall see
that Penrose fails to appreciate the contrapositive point, which is that if we take statistical
reasoning to be inappropriate towards the past, we should not take it to be appropriate with
respect to the future.
5decisive in the other, in which case its conclusion would conflict with what we
know to be the case, namely that entropy decreases towards the Big Bang.
In view of the importance of the argument it is worth spelling it out in
more detail, and giving it a name. I’ll call it the Gravitational Argument from
Symmetry (GAS, for short). The argument has three main steps:
1. We consider the natural condition of a universe at the end of a process of
gravitational collapse—in other words, we ask what the universe might be
expected to be like in its late stages, when it collapses under its own weight.
As noted above, the answer is that it is overwhelmingly likely to be in a very
inhomogeneous state—clumpy, rather than smooth.
2. We reflect on the fact that if we view the history of our universe in re-
verse, what we see is a universe collapsing under its own gravity, accelerating
towards a Big Crunch. As argued in step 1, the natural destiny for such a
universe is not the smooth one we know our own universe to have.
3. We note that there is no objective sense in which this reverse way of
viewing the universe is any less valid than the usual way of viewing it.
Nothing in physics tells us that there is a wrong or a right way to choose
the orientation of the temporal coordinates. Nothing in physics tells us that
one end of the universe is objectively the start and the other end objectively
the finish. In other words, the perspective adopted at step 2 is just as valid
as a basis for determining the natural condition of what we normally call
the early universe as the standard perspective is for determining the likely
condition of what normally call the late universe.
The lesson of GAS is that there is much less scope for differentiating the
early and late stages of a universe than tends to be assumed. If we want to
treat the late stages in terms of a theory of gravitational collapse, we should
be prepared to treat the early stages in the same way. Or in other words
if we treat the early stages in some other way—in terms of some additional
boundary constraint, for example—then we should be prepared to consider the
possibility that the late stages may be subject to the same constraint. Failure to
appreciate this point has tended to obscure what may justly be called the basic
dilemma of cosmology and temporal asymmetry. In virtue of the symmetry
considerations, it seems that our choices are either to follow Gold, admitting
reversal of the thermodynamic arrow in the case of gravitational collapse; or
to acknowledge that temporal asymmetry is simply inexplicable—i.e., that the
low initial entropy of the universe is not a predictable consequence of our best
physical theories of the universe as a whole.
Later on I shall discuss a range of possible responses to this basic dilemma.
First of all, however, in order to illustrate how thoroughly contemporary cosmol-
ogists have failed to appreciate the dilemma and the symmetry considerations
6on which it rests, I want to discuss two recent suggestions as to the origins of
cosmological time asymmetry.
The appeal to inflation
The first case stems from the inflationary model. The basic idea here is that in
its extremely early stages the universe undergoes a period of exponential expan-
sion, driven by a gravitational force which at that time is repulsive rather than
attractive. At the end of that period, as gravity becomes attractive, the universe
settles into the more sedate expansion of the classical Big Bang.7 Among the
attractions of this model has been thought to be its ability to account for the
smoothness of the universe after the Big Bang. However, the argument for this
conclusion is essentially a statistical one: the crucial claim is that the repulsive
gravity in the inflationary phase will tend to ‘iron out’ inhomogeneities, leav-
ing a smooth universe at the time of the transition to the classical Big Bang.
The argument is presented by Paul Davies, who concludes that ‘the Universe
... began in an arbitrary, rather than remarkably specific, state. This is pre-
cisely what one would expect if the Universe is to be explained as a spontaneous
random quantum fluctuation from nothing.’8
This argument graphically illustrates the temporal double standard that
commonly applies in discussions of these problems. The point is that as in step
2 of GAS we might equally well argue, viewing the expansion from the Big
Bang in reverse, that (what will then appear as) the gravitational collapse to
the Big Bang must produce inhomogeneities at the time of the transition to the
inflationary phase (which will now appear as a deflationary phase, of course).
Unless one temporal direction is already privileged, the argument is as good in
one direction as the other. So in the absence of a justification for the double
standard—a reason to apply the statistical argument in one direction rather
than the other—Davies’ argument cannot possibly do the work required of it.
This is close to the point made in reply to Davies by Don Page.9 Page objects
that in arguing statistically with respect to behaviour during the inflationary
phase, Davies is in effect assuming the very time asymmetry which needs to
be explained (i.e., that entropy increases). However, Davies might reply that
statistical reasoning is acceptable in the absence of constraining boundary con-
ditions. It seems to me there are two possible replies at this point. One might
argue (as Page does) that initial conditions have to be special to give rise to
inflation in the first place, and hence that Davies’ imagined initial conditions
are in fact far from arbitrary. Or more directly one might argue as I have, viz.
that if there is no boundary constraint at the time of transition from inflation-
ary phase to classical Big Bang, then we are equally entitled to argue from the
other direction, with the conclusion that the universe is inhomogeneous at this
stage.
7For a general introduction to the inflationary model see Linde´ (1987).
8Davies (1983), 398.
9Page (1983).
7Davies himself argues that ‘a recontracting Universe arriving at the big
crunch would not undergo “deflation”, for this would require an exceedingly im-
probable conspiracy of quantum coherence to reverse-tunnel through the phase
transition. There is thus a distinct and fundamental asymmetry between the
beginning and the end of a recontracting Universe.’10 However, he fails to no-
tice that this is in conflict with the argument he has given us concerning the
other end of the universe, a conflict which can only be resolved either (i) by
acknowledging that inflation is abnormal (and hence requires explanation, if we
are to explain temporal asymmetry); or (ii) by arguing that although the co-
herence required for deflation looks improbable, it is in fact guaranteed by the
reverse of the argument Davies himself uses with respect to the other end of the
universe. But to accept (ii) would be to accept that entropy decreases as the
universe recollapses, a view that as we shall see, Davies feels can be dismissed
on other grounds. As it is, therefore, Davies is vulnerable to the charge that
his own admission that collapse doesn’t require deflation automatically entails
that expansion doesn’t require inflation. Again, this follows immediately from
the realisation that there is nothing objective about the temporal orientation.
A universe that collapses without deflation just is a universe that expands with-
out inflation. It is exactly the same universe, under a different but equally valid
description.11
Hawking and the Big Crunch12
Our second example is better known, having been described in Stephen Hawk-
ing’s best seller, A Brief History of Time.13 It is Hawking’s proposal to account
for temporal asymmetry in terms of what he calls the No Boundary Condi-
tion (NBC)—a proposal concerning the quantum wave function of the universe.
To see what is puzzling about Hawking’s claim, let us keep in mind the basic
dilemma. It seemed that provided we avoid double standard fallacies, any argu-
ment for the smoothness of the universe would apply at both ends or at neither.
So our choices seemed to be to accept the globally symmetric Gold universe,
or to resign ourselves to the fact that temporal asymmetry is not explicable
(without additional assumptions or boundary conditions) by a time-symmetric
physics. The dilemma is particularly acute for Hawking, because he has a more
reason than most to avoid resorting to additional boundary conditions. They
conflict with the spirit of his NBC, namely that one restrict possible histories
10Davies (1983), 399.
11All the same, it might seem that there is an unresolved puzzle here: as we approach the
transition between an inflationary phase and the classical phase from one side, most paths
through phase space seem to imply a smooth state at the transition. As we approach it from
the other side most paths through phase space appear to imply a very non-smooth state. How
can these facts can be compatible with one another? I take it that the answer is that the
existence of the inflationary phase is in fact a very strong boundary constraint, invalidating
the usual statistical reasoning from the ‘future’ side of the transition.
12This section expands on some concerns expressed in Price (1989).
13Hawking (1988).
8for the universe to those that ‘are finite in extent but have no boundaries, edges,
or singularities.’14
Hawking tells us how initially he thought that this proposal favoured the
former horn of the above dilemma: ‘I thought at first that the no boundary
condition did indeed imply that disorder would decrease in the contracting
phase.’15 He changed his mind, however, in response to objections from two
colleagues: ‘I realized that I had made a mistake: the no boundary condition
implied that disorder would in fact continue to increase during the contraction.
The thermodynamic and psychological arrows of time would not reverse when
the universe begins to contract or inside black holes.’16
This change of mind enables Hawking to avoid the apparent difficulties as-
sociated with reversing the thermodynamic arrow of time. What is not clear is
how he avoids the alternative difficulties associated with not reversing the ther-
modynamic arrow of time. That is, Hawking does not explain how his proposal
can imply that entropy is low near the Big Bang, without equally implying that
it is low near the Big Crunch. The problem is to get a temporally asymmetric
consequence from a symmetric physical theory. Hawking suggests that he has
done it, but doesn’t explain how. Readers are entitled to feel a little dissatisfied.
As it stands, Hawking’s account reads a bit like a suicide verdict on a man who
has been stabbed in the back: not an impossible feat, perhaps, but we’d like to
know how it was done!
It seems to me that there are three possible resolutions of this mystery.
The first, obviously, is that Hawking has found a way round the difficulty. The
easiest way to get an idea of what he would have to have established is to think of
three classes of possible universes: those which are smooth and ordered at both
temporal extremities, those which are ordered at one extremity but disordered
at the other, and those which are disordered at both extremities. If Hawking
is right, then he has found a way to exclude the last class, without thereby
excluding the second class. In other words, he has found a way to exclude
disorder at one temporal extremity of the universe, without excluding disorder
at both extremities. Why is this combination the important one? Because if
we can’t exclude universes with disorder at both extremities, then we haven’t
explained why our universe doesn’t have disorder at both extremities—we know
that it has order at least one temporal extremity, namely the extremity we think
of as at the beginning of time. And if we do exclude disorder at both extremities,
we are back to the answer that Hawking gave up, namely that order will increase
when the universe contracts.
Has Hawking shown that the second class of universal histories, the order–
disorder universes, are overwhelmingly probable? It is important to appreciate
that this would not be incompatible with the underlying temporal symmetry
of the physical theories concerned. A symmetric physical theory might be such
14Hawking (1988), 148.
15Hawking (1988), 150.
16Hawking (1988), 150.
9that all or most of its possible realisations were asymmetric. Thus Hawking
might have succeeded in showing that the NBC implies that any (or almost
any) possible history for the universe is of this globally asymmetric kind. If
so, however, then he hasn’t yet explained to his lay readers how he managed
it. In a moment I’ll describe my attempts to find a solution in Hawking’s
technical papers. What seems clear is that it can’t be done by reflecting on
the consequences of the NBC for the state of one temporal extremity of the
universe, considered in isolation. For if that worked for the ‘initial’ state it
would also work for the ‘final’ state; unless of course the argument had illicitly
assumed an objective distinction between initial state and final state, and hence
applied some constraint to the former that it didn’t apply to the latter. What
Hawking needs is a more general argument, to the effect that disorder–disorder
universes are impossible (or at least overwhelmingly improbable). It needs to be
shown that almost all possible universes have at at least one ordered temporal
extremity—or equivalently, at most one disordered extremity. (As Hawking
points out, it will then be quite legitimate to invoke a weak anthropic argument
to explain why we regard the ordered extremity thus guaranteed as an initial
extremity. In virtue of its consequences for temporal asymmetry elsewhere in
the universe, conscious observers are bound to regard this state of order as lying
in their past.)
That’s the first possibility: Hawking has such an argument, but hasn’t told
us what it is (probably because he doesn’t see why it is so important).17 As I
see it, the other possibilities are that Hawking has made one of two mistakes
(neither of them the mistake he claims to have made). Either his NBC does
exclude disorder at both temporal extremities of the universe, in which case
his mistake was to change his mind about contraction leading to decreasing
entropy; or the proposal doesn’t exclude disorder at either temporal extremity
of the universe, in which case his mistake is to think that the NBC accounts for
the low entropy Big Bang.
I have done my best to examine Hawking’s published papers in order to
discover which of these three possibilities best fits the case. A helpful recent
paper is Hawking’s contribution to a meeting on the arrow of time held in
Spain in 1991.18 In this paper Hawking describes the process by which he and
various colleagues applied the NBC to the question of temporal asymmetry.
He recounts how he and Halliwell ‘calculated the spectrum of perturbations
predicted by the no boundary condition’.19 The conclusion was that ‘one gets
an arrow of time. The universe is nearly homogeneous and isotropic when it
17This loophole may be smaller than it looks. Hawking’s NBC would not provide an in-
teresting explanation of temporal asymmetry if it simply operated like the assumption that
all allowable models of the universe display the required asymmetry. This would amount to
putting the asymmetry in ‘by hand’ (as physicists say), to stipulating what we wanted to
explain. If the NBC is to exploit this loophole, in other words, it must imply this asymmetry,
while being sufficiently removed from it so as not to seem ad hoc.
18Hawking (1993), Page references here are to a preprint version.
19Hawking (1993), 4.
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is small. But it is more irregular, when it is large. In other words, disorder
increases, as the universe expands.’20 I want to note in particular that at this
stage Hawking doesn’t refer to the stage of the universe in temporal terms—
start and finish, for example—but only in terms of its size. Indeed he correctly
points out that the temporal perspective comes from us, and depends in practice
on the thermodynamic arrow.
Hawking then tells us how he
made what I now realize was a great mistake. I thought that the No
Boundary Condition would imply that the perturbations would be small
whenever the radius of the universe was small. That is, the perturba-
tions would be small not only in the early stages of the expansion, but
also in the late stages of a universe that collapsed again. ... This would
mean that disorder would increase during the expansion, but decrease
again during the contraction.
He goes on to say how he was persuaded that this was a mistake, as a result of
objections raised by Page and Laflamme. He came to accept that
When the radius of the universe is small, there are two kinds of solution.
One would be an almost euclidean complex solution, that started like
the north pole of a sphere, and expanded monotonically up to a given
radius. This would correspond to the start of the expansion. But the
end of the contraction would correspond to a solution that started in a
similar way, but then had a long almost lorentzian period of expansion,
followed by a contraction to the given radius. ... This would mean that
the perturbations would be small at one end of time, but could be large
and non linear at the other end. So disorder and irregularity would
increase during the expansion, and would continue to increase during
the contraction.21
Hawking then describes how he and Glenn Lyons have ‘studied how the arrow of
time manifests in the various perturbation modes’. He says that there are two
relevant kinds of perturbation mode, those that oscillate and those that don’t.
The former ‘will be essentially time symmetric, about the time of maximum
expansion. In other words the amplitude of perturbation will be the same at a
given radius during the expansion as at the same radius during the contraction
phase.’22 The latter, by contrast, ‘will grow in amplitude in general. They
will be small when they come within the horizon during expansion. But they
will grow during the expansion, and continue to grow during the contraction.
Eventually they will become non linear. At this stage, the trajectories will
spread out over a large region of phase space.’23 It is the latter perturbation
modes which, in virtue of the fact they are so much more common, lead to the
conclusion that disorder increases as the universe recontracts.
20Hawking (1993), 4.
21Hawking (1993), 6.
22Hawking (1993), 6.
23Hawking (1993), 6-7.
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Let us focus on the last quotation. If it is not an objective matter which
end of the universe represents expansion and which contraction, and there isn’t
a constraint which operates simply in virtue of the radius of the universe, why
should the perturbations ever be small? Why can’t they be large at both ends,
compatibly with the NBC?
I have been unable to find an answer to this crucial question in Hawking’s
papers. However, in an important earlier paper by Hawking and Halliwell,24 the
authors consistently talk of showing that the relevant modes start off in a par-
ticular condition. Let me give you some examples (with my italics throughout).
First from the abstract: ‘We ... show ... that the inhomogeneous or anisotropic
modes start off in their ground state.’25 Next from the introduction:
We show that the gravitational-wave and density-perturbation modes
obey decoupled time-dependent Schro¨dinger equations with respect to
the time parameter of the classical solution. The boundary conditions
imply that these modes start off in the ground state. ...
We use the path-integral expression for the wave function in sec. VII
to show that the perturbation wave functions start out in their ground
states.26
How are we to interpret these references to how the universe starts off, or starts
out? Do they embody an assumption that one temporal extremity of the uni-
verse is objectively its start? Presumably Hawking and Halliwell would want
to deny that they do so, for otherwise they have simply helped themselves to a
temporal asymmetry at this crucial stage of the argument. (As I have noted,
Hawking is in other places quite clear that our usual tendency to regard one end
of the universe as the start is anthropocentric in origin, though related to the
thermodynamic arrow—in virtue of their dependence on the entropy gradient,
sentient creatures are bound to regard the low entropy direction as the past.)
But without this assumption what is the objective content of Hawking and Hal-
liwell’s conclusions? Surely it can only be that the specified results obtain when
the universe is small; in which case the argument works either at both ends or
at neither.
We have seen that in reconsidering his earlier views on the fate of a collaps-
ing universe, Hawking appears to be moved by what is essentially a statistical
consideration: the fact that (as Page convinced him) most possible histories lead
to a disordered collapse. However, the lesson of GAS was that in the absence of
any prior justification for a temporal double standard, statistical arguments de-
fer to boundary conditions. (The fact that the Big Bang is smooth trumps any
general appeal to the clumpiness of the end states of gravitational collapse.) Ac-
cordingly, it would apparently have been open to Hawking to argue that Page’s
statistical considerations were simply overridden by the NBC, treated as a sym-
24Hawking and Halliwell (1985).
25Hawking and Halliwell (1985), 1977.
26Hawking and Halliwell (1985), 1978.
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metric constraint on the temporal extremities of the universe. Given that he
does not argue this way, however, he needs to explain why analogous statistical
arguments do not apply towards (what we call) the Big Bang.
Thus it is my impression that Hawking did indeed make a mistake about
temporal asymmetry, but not the mistake he thought he made. Either the mis-
take occurred earlier, if he and Halliwell have illicitly relied on the assumption
that the universe has an objective start; or it occurred when Hawking failed to
see that in virtue of the fact that the Hawking-Halliwell argument depends only
on size, it does yield boundary conditions for both temporal extremities of the
universe, and hence excludes the possible histories which Page and Laflamme
took to be problematic for his original endorsement of the time-reversing col-
lapse. And if he didn’t make either of these mistakes, then at the very least
he has failed to see the need to avoid them, for otherwise he would surely have
explained how he managed to do so.
The basic dilemma, and some ways to avoid it
The above examples suggest that even some of the most capable of modern cos-
mologists appear to have difficulty in grasping what I called the basic dilemma of
cosmology and time asymmetry. To restate this dilemma, it is that apparently
have to accept either (option 1) that entropy decreases towards all singularities,
including future ones; or (option 2) that temporal asymmetry, and particularly
the low entropy condition of the Big Bang, is not explicable by a time-symmetric
physics.27
The writer who has done most to bring to our attention the force of this
dilemma is Roger Penrose, who chooses option 2.28 (We shall look later at
his reasons for rejecting option 1.) Accordingly, Penrose suggests that there is
an additional asymmetric law of nature to the effect that initial singularities
obey what amounts to a smoothness constraint. In effect, he is arguing that
it is reasonable to believe that such a constraint exists, because otherwise the
universe as we find it would be wildly unlikely. Penrose’s use of the term initial
singularity might itself seem to violate our requirement that the terms initial
and final not be regarded as of any objective significance. However in this case
the difficulty is clearly superficial: Penrose’s claim need only be that it is a
physical law that there is one temporal direction in which the Weyl curvature
always approaches zero towards singularities. The fact that conscious observers
inevitably regard that direction as the past will then follow from the sort of
weak anthropic argument we have already mentioned.29
27It might be thought that the dilemma only arises if the universe recollapses. Perhaps the
universe is bound to be such that it doesn’t recollapse. (This is predicted by some inflationary
models.) But even if the universe as a whole never recollapses to a singularity, it appears that
parts of it do, as certain massive objects collapse to black holes. The dilemma arises again
with respect to these regions. This point is made for example by Penrose (1979), 597-8.
28See Penrose (1979), and particularly Penrose (1989), ch. 7.
29It seems to me that Penrose himself misses this point, however. For example in discussing
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Notice however that even an advocate of the time-symmetric option 1 might
be convinced by Penrose’s argument that the observed condition of the uni-
verse can only be accounted for by an independent physical law—the difference
would be that such a person would take the law to be that the Weyl curvature
approaches zero towards all singularities. Before we turn to the various rea-
sons that have been offered for rejecting option 1, let me mention some possible
strategies towards the third option, which is somehow to evade the dilemma
altogether.
The first possibility is the one mentioned above in our discussion of Hawk-
ing’s proposal. We noted that it is possible that a symmetric theory might have
only (or mostly) asymmetric models. This may seem an attractive solution, at
least in comparison to the alternatives, but two notes of caution seem in order.
First, as was pointed out earlier,30 a proposal of this kind needs to distance
itself from the accusation that it simply puts in the required asymmetry ‘by
hand’. It is difficult to lay down precise guidelines for avoiding this mistake—
after all, if the required asymmetry weren’t already implicit in the theoretical
premisses in some sense, it couldn’t be derived from them—but presumably the
intention should be that asymmetry should flow from principles which are not
manifestly asymmetric, and which have independent theoretical justification.
Second, we should not be misled into expecting a solution of this kind—
predominantly asymmetric models of a symmetric theory—by the sort of sta-
tistical reasoning employed in step 1 of GAS. In particular, we should not think
that the intuition that the most likely fate for the universe is a clumpy gravita-
tional collapse makes a solution of this kind prima facie more plausible than a
globally symmetric model of Gold’s kind. The point of GAS was that these sta-
tistical grounds are temporally symmetric: if they excluded Gold’s suggestion
then they would also exclude models with a low entropy Big Bang. In effect, the
hypothesis that the Big Bang is explicable is the hypothesis that something—
perhaps a boundary condition of some kind, perhaps an alternative statistical
argument, conducted in terms of possible models of a theory—defeats these
statistical considerations in cosmology, with the result that we are left with no
reason to expect an asymmetric solution in preference to Gold’s symmetric pro-
posal. On the contrary, the right way to reason seems to be something like this:
the smoothness of the Big Bang shows that statistical arguments based on the
character of gravitational collapse are not always reliable—on the contrary, they
are unreliable in the one case (out of a possible two!) in which we can actually
subject them to observational test. Having discovered this, should we continue
to regard them as reliable in the remaining case (i.e., when oriented towards the
Big Crunch)? Obviously not, at least in the absence of any independent reason
for applying such a double standard.
the Weyl curvature hypothesis (Penrose (1989), 352-3), he gives us absolutely no indication
that he regards the fact that some singularities are initial and others final as of anything other
than objective significance.
30See footnote 17.
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It is true that things would be different if we were prepared to allow that
the low entropy Big Bang is not explicable—that it is just a statistical ‘fluke’.
In this case we might well argue that we have very good grounds to expect
the universe to be ‘flukey’ only at one end. However, at this point we would
have abandoned the strategy of trying to show that almost all possible universes
are asymmetric, the goal of which was precisely to explain the low entropy Big
Bang. Instead we might be pursuing a different strategy altogether. Perhaps
the reason that the universe looks so unusual to us is simply that we can only
exist in very unusual bits of it. Given that we depend on the entropy gradient,
in other words, perhaps this explains why we find ourselves in a region of the
universe exhibiting such a gradient.
I am not going to explore this anthropic idea in any detail here. Let me
simply mention two large difficulties that it faces. The first is that it depends
on there being a genuine multiplicity of actual ‘bits’ of a much larger universe,
of which our bit is simply some small corner. It is no use relying on other merely
possible worlds.31 So the anthropic solution is exceedingly costly in ontological
terms. (This would not matter if the cost was one we were committed to bearing
anyway, of course, as perhaps in some inflationary pictures, where universes in
our sense are merely bubbles in some grand foam of universes.)
The second difficulty is that as Penrose emphasises,32 there may well be
much less costly ways to generate a sufficient entropy gradient to support life.
Penrose argues that the observed universe is still vastly more unlikely than life
requires. However, it is not clear that inflation does not leave a loophole here,
too. If the inflationary model could show that a universe of the size of ours
is an ‘all or nothing’ matter, then the anthropic argument would be back on
track. The quantum preconditions for inflation might be extremely rare, but
this doesn’t matter, so long as (a) there is enough time in some background
grand universe for them to occur eventually and (b) when (and only when) they
do occur a universe of our sort arises, complete with its smooth boundary. Hence
it seems to me that this anthropic strategy is still viable—albeit repugnant to
well brought up Occamists!
The case against the Gold universe
To choose the first horn of the basic dilemma is to allow that our universe
might have low entropy at both ends, or more generally in the region of any
singularity. Of course, the issue then arises as to why this should be the case.
One option, perhaps in the end the only one, is to accept the low entropy of
singularities as an additional law of nature. As we saw, this would be in the
spirit of Penrose’s proposal, but it would still be a time-symmetric law. True,
we might find such a law somewhat ad hoc. But this might seem a price worth
31Unless in David Lewis’s sense, so that ‘actual’ is simply indexical, and denotes no special
objective status. See Lewis (1986).
32Penrose (1979), 634.
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paying, if the alternative is that we have no explanation for such a striking
physical anomaly.33
In suggesting the symmetric time-reversing universe in the 1960s, Gold was
attracted to the idea that the expansion of the universe might account for the
second law of thermodynamics. He saw that this would entail that the law would
change direction if the universe recontracts. Thus the universe would enter an
age of apparent miracles. Radiation would converge on stars, apples would
compose themselves in decompost heaps and leap into trees, and humanoids
would arise from their own ashes, grow younger, and become unborn. These
humanoids wouldn’t see things this way, of course. Their psychological time
sense would also be reversed, so that from their point of view their world would
look much as ours does to us.
However, by now it should be obvious that such apparently miraculous be-
haviour cannot in itself constitute an objection to this symmetric model of the
universe, for reasons exactly analogous to those invoked in GAS. Perhaps sur-
prisingly (in view of his tendency to appeal to a double standard elsewhere) this
point is well made by Davies. After describing some ‘miraculous’ behaviour of
this kind, Davies continues: ‘It is curious that this seems so laughable, because it
is simply a description of our present world given in reversed-time language. Its
occurrence is no more remarkable than what we at present experience—indeed
it is what we actually experience—the difference in description being purely se-
mantic and not physical.’34 Davies goes on to point out that the difficulty really
lies in managing the transition: ‘What is remarkable, however, is the fact that
our ‘forward’ time world changes into [a] backward time world (or vice versa,
as the situation is perfectly symmetric).’
What exactly are the problems about this transition? In the informal work
from which I have just quoted, Davies suggests that the main problem is that
it requires that the universe have very special initial conditions.
Although the vast majority of microscopic motions in the big bang
give rise to purely entropy-increasing worlds, a very, very special set
of motions could indeed result in an initial entropy increase, followed
by a subsequent decrease. For this to come about the microscopic
constituents of the universe would not be started off moving ran-
domly after all, but each little particle, each electromagnetic wave,
set off along a carefully chosen path to lead to this very special fu-
ture evolution. ... Such a changeover requires ... an extraordinary
degree of cooperation between countless numbers of atoms.35
Davies here alludes to his earlier conclusion that ‘a time-asymmetric universe
does not demand any very special initial conditions. It seems to imply a
33These considerations apply as much to Penrose’s asymmetric proposal as to its symmetric
variant. Note also that the proposal might seem less ad hoc if attractively grounded on formal
theoretical considerations of some kind, as might arguably be true of Hawking’s NBC.
34Davies (1977), 196.
35Davies (1977), 195-6.
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creation which is of a very general and random character at the microscopic
level.’36However, we have seen that to maintain this view of the early universe
while invoking the usual statistical arguments with respect to the late universe
is to operate with a double standard: double standards aside, GAS shows that
if a late universe is naturally clumpy, so too is an early universe. In the present
context the relevant point is that (as Davies himself notes, in effect37) the con-
ventional time-asymmetric view itself requires that the final conditions of the
universe be microscopically arranged so that when viewed in the reverse of the
ordinary sense, the countless atoms cooperate over billions of years to achieve
the remarkable low entropy state of the Big Bang. Again, therefore, a double
standard is involved in taking it to be an argument against Gold’s view that
it requires this cooperation in the initial conditions. As before, the relevant
statistical argument is an instrument with two possible uses. We know that it
yields the wrong answer in one of these uses, in that it would exclude an early
universe of the kind we actually observe. Should we take it to be reliable in its
other use, which differs only in temporal orientation from the case in which the
argument so glaringly fails? Symmetry and simple caution both suggest that
we should not!
A very different sort of objection to the time-reversing model is raised by
Penrose in the following passage:
Let us envisage an astronaut in such a universe who falls into a black
hole. For definiteness, suppose that it is a hole of 1010 [solar masses]
so that our astronaut will have something like a day inside [the event
horizon], for most of which time he will encounter no appreciable
tidal forces and during which he could conduct experiments in a
leisurely way. ... Suppose that experiments are performed by the
astronaut for a period while he is inside the hole. The behaviour
of his apparatus (indeed, of the metabolic processes within his own
body) is entirely determined by conditions at the black hole’s singu-
larity ...—as, equally, it is entirely determined by the conditions at
the big bang. The situation inside the black hole differs in no essen-
tial respect from that at the late stages of a recollapsing universe. If
one’s viewpoint is to link the local direction of time’s arrow directly
to the expansion of the universe, then one must surely be driven to
expect that our astronaut’s experiments will behave in an entropy-
decreasing way (with respect to ‘normal’ time). Indeed, one should
presumably be driven to expect that the astronaut would believe
himself to be coming out of the hole rather than falling in (assum-
ing his metabolic processes could operate consistently through such
a drastic reversal of the normal progression of entropy).38
This objection seems to me to put unreasonable demands on the nature of the
36Davies (1977), 193.
37Davies (1974), 199.
38Penrose (1979), 598-9.
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temporal reversal in these time-symmetric models. Consider Penrose’s astro-
naut. He is presumably a product of 109 years of biological evolution, to say
nothing of the 1010 years of cosmological evolution which created the conditions
for biology to begin on our planet. So he is the sort of physical structure that
could only exist at this kind of distance from a suitable big bang. (What counts
as suitable? The relevant point is that low entropy doesn’t seem to be enough;
for a start, the bang will have to be massive enough to produce the cosmological
structure on which life depends.)
All this means that our astronaut isn’t going to encounter any time-reversed
humanoids inside the black hole, any unevolving life, or even any unforming
stars and galaxies. More importantly, it means that he himself doesn’t need to
have an inverse evolutionary history inside the hole, in addition to the history
he already has outside. He doesn’t need to be a ‘natural’ product of the hole’s
singularity. Relative to its reversed time sense, he’s simply a miracle. The same
goes for his apparatus—in general, for all the ‘foreign’ structure he imports into
the hole.
Notice here that there are two possible models of the connections that might
obtain between the products of two low entropy boundary conditions: a ‘meet-
ing’ model, in which any piece of structure or order is a ‘natural’ product of both
a past singularity and a future singularity; and a ‘mixing’ model, in which it is
normally a product of one or the other but not necessarily both. (See Figure
1.) Penrose’s argument appears to assume the meeting model. Hawking also
seems to assuming this model when he suggests39 that the astronaut entering
the event horizon of a black hole wouldn’t notice the time reversal because his
psychological time sense would reverse. As I say, however, this seems to me to
place a quite unnecessary constraint on the time-reversal view. The appropri-
ate guiding principle seems to be that any piece of structure needs to explained
either as a product of a past singularity or as a product of the future singu-
larity; but that no piece needs both sorts of explanation. The proportions of
each kind can be expected to vary from case to case. In may well be that in
our region of the universe, virtually all the structure results from the Big Bang.
This might continue to be the case if in future we fall into the sort of black hole
which doesn’t have the time or mass to produce much structure of its own. In
this case the experience might be very much less odd than Penrose’s thought
experiment would have us believe. The reverse structure produced by the black
hole might be insignificant for most of the time we survived within its event
horizon.
What if we approach a black hole which is big enough to produce interesting
structure—the Big Crunch itself, for example? Doesn’t Penrose’s argument still
apply in this case? It seems to me that the case is still far from conclusive, so
long as we bear in mind that our structure doesn’t need a duplicate explanation
from the opposite point of view. It is true that in this case we will expect
39Hawking (1985), 2490.
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eventually to be affected by the reverse structure we encounter. For example,
suppose that our spacecraft approaches what from the reverse point of view is
a normal star. From the reverse point of view we are an object leaving the
vicinity of the star. We appear to be heated by radiation from the star, but to
be gradually cooling as we move further away from the star, thus receiving less
energy from it, and radiating energy into empty space.
What would this course of events look like from our own point of view? Ap-
parently we would begin to heat up as photons ‘inexplicably’ converged on us
from empty space. This inflow of radiation would increase with time. Perhaps
even more puzzlingly, however, we would notice that our craft was re-radiating
towards one particular direction in space—towards what from our point of view
is a giant radiation sink. Whether we could detect this radiation directly is a
nice question—more on this below—but we might expect it to be detectable
indirectly. For example we might expect that the inside of the wall of the space-
ship facing the reverse star would feel cold to the touch, reflecting what in our
time sense would be a flow of heat energy towards the star. These phenomena
would certainly be bizarre by our ordinary standards, but it is not clear that
their possibility constitutes an objection to the possibility of entropy reversal.
After all, within the framework of the Gold entropy-reversing model itself they
are not in the least unexpected or inexplicable. To generate a substantial ob-
jection to the model, it needs to be shown that it leads to incoherencies of some
kind, and not merely to the unexpected. Whether this can be shown seems to
be an open question. More on this in the next section.
Penrose himself no longer puts much weight on the astronaut argument.40
In recent correspondence he says that he now thinks that a much stronger case
can be made against the suggestion that entropy decreases towards singulari-
ties. He argues that in virtue of its commitment to temporal symmetry this
view must either disallow black holes in the future, or allow for a proliferation
of white holes in the past. He says that the first of these options ‘requires physi-
cally unacceptable teleology’, while the second would conflict with the observed
smoothness of the early universe.41 However, the objection to the first option
is primarily statistical: ‘it would have to be a seemingly remarkably improbable
set of coincidences that would forbid black holes forming. The hypothesis of
black holes being not allowed in the future provides “unreasonable” constraints
on what matter is allowed to do in the past.’ 42 And this means that Penrose
is again invoking the old double standard, in accepting the ‘naturalness’ argu-
ment with respect to the future but not the past. Once again: the lesson of
the smooth past seems to be that in that case something overrides the natural
behaviour of a gravitational collapse; once this possibility is admitted, however,
we have no non-question-begging grounds to exclude (or even to doubt!) the
40Though it appears as recently as Penrose (1989), 334-5.
41Penrose (1991).
42Penrose (1991).
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hypothesis that the same overriding factor might operate in the future.43
Is a reversing future observable? Is it consistent?
Now to return to the issues we deferred above, concerning the observability and
hence the coherency of the Gold model. To give the enquiry a slightly less
speculative character, let us locate our observers on Earth. Suppose that the
actual universe were a Gold universe, and a terrestrial telescope was pointed in
the direction of a reverse-galaxy—i.e., a galaxy in the what in our time sense is
the contracting half of the universe. What effect, if any, would this have on the
telescope and its environs?
As in the earlier case, a first step is to consider matters from the reverse point
of view. To an astronomer resident in the reverse-galaxy, light emitted from that
galaxy appears to be being collected and eventually absorbed by the distant
telescope on Earth. This astronomer will therefore expect appropriate effects
to take place at the back of our telescope: a black plate there will be heated
slightly by the incoming radiation from the astronomer’s galaxy, for example.
But what does this look like from our point of view? Our temporal sense is the
reverse of that of the distant astronomer, so that what she regards as absorption
of radiation seems to us to be emission, and vice versa. Apparent directions of
heat flow are similarly reversed. Thus as we point our telescope in the distant
galaxy’s direction, its influence should show up directly in a suddenly increased
flow of radiation from the telescope into space, and indirectly as an apparent
cooling in the temperature of the black plate at the rear of our telescope. The
plate will apparently seem cooler than its surroundings, in virtue of the inflow
of heat energy which is to be re-radiated towards the distant galaxy.
As in normal astronomy, the size of these effects will naturally depend on
the distance and intensity of the reverse-source. Size aside, however, there seem
to be theoretical difficulties in detecting the effects by what might seem the
obvious methods. For example, it will be no use placing a photographic plate
over the aperture of the telescope, hoping to record the emission of the radiation
concerned. If we consider things from the point of view of the distant reverse-
observer it is clear that the plate will act as a shield, obscuring the telescope
43Cf. the argument in Davies (1974), 96, based on the work of Rees. This too is effectively
a statistical argument, for the point is that ‘in the normal course of events’ radiation will not
reconverge on stars. In the normal course of events it wouldn’t do so in the reverse direction
either, but something seems to override the statistical constraint.
Davies has another radiation-based argument against the Gold universe: ‘Any photons
that get across the switch-over unabsorbed will find when they encounter matter that the
prevailing thermodynamic processes are such as to produce anti-damping .... If a light wave
were to encounter the surface of a metallic object, it would multiply in energy exponentially
instead of diminish. ... Consistency problems of this sort are bound to arise when oppositely
directed regions of the universe are causally coupled together.’ (Davies (1974), 194) However,
Davies apparently no longer regards this as a powerful argument against the time-reversing
view, for in Davies and Twamley (1993) he and Jason Twamley canvas other ways in which
radiation might behave in a time-reversing cosmos. I turn to the most significant of these
arguments in the next section.
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from the light from this observer’s galaxy. Thus from our point of view the
light will be emitted from the back of the plate: the side facing away from the
telescope, toward the reverse-galaxy.
The important thing seems to be that the detector effect be one that from
the reverse point of view does not depend on any very special initial state—since
that would be a special final state from our point of view, which accordingly we
couldn’t ‘prepare’. Unfogging photo plates perhaps won’t work for this reason,
for example. We can’t guarantee that the plate finishes in an unfogged condition
(in the way that we can normally guarantee that it starts that way). Provided
this requirement for a ‘non-special’ boundary state is satisfied, we appear to be
entitled to assume that the detector will behave as we would expect it to if the
boot were on the other foot, so to speak: in other words, if we were transmitting
towards a detector belonging to the inhabitants of the reversing-future.
Let us now look at this behaviour in a little more detail. If we shine a light
at an absorbing surface we expect its temperature to increase. If the incoming
light intensity is constant the temperature will soon stabilise at a higher level,
as the system reaches a new equilibrium. If the light is then turned off the
temperature then drops exponentially to its previous value. Hence if future
reverse-astronomers shine a laser beam in the direction of one of our telescopes,
at the back of which is an absorbing plate, the temperature change they would
expect to take place in the plate is as shown in Figure 2a. When the telescope
is opened the temperature of the plate rises due to the effect of the incoming
radiation, stabilising at a new higher value. If the telescope is then shut, so that
the plate no longer absorbs radiation, its temperature drops again to the initial
value.
Figure 2b shows what this behaviour looks like from our point of view. As
explained above, both the temporal ordering of events and the direction of
change of the apparent temperature of the plate relative to its surroundings has
to be reversed. One of the striking things about this behaviour is that it appears
to involve advanced effects. The temperature falls before we open the telescope,
and rises before we close it. This suggests that we might be able to argue that
the whole possibility is incoherent, using a version of the bilking argument.
Couldn’t we adopt the following policy, for example: Open the telescope only
if the temperature of the black plate has not just fallen significantly below that
of its surroundings. It might seem that this entirely plausible policy forces
the hypothesis to yield contradictory predictions, thus providing a reductio ad
absurdum of the time-reversing view. However, it is not clear the results are
contradictory. Grant for the moment that while this policy is in force it will
not happen that the temperature of the plate falls on an occasion on which
we might have opened the telescope, but didn’t actually do so. This leaves
the possibility that on all relevant trials the temperature does not fall, and the
telescope is opened. Is this inconsistent with the presence of radiation from the
future reverse-source?
I don’t think it is. Bear in mind that the temperature profile depicted in
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these diagrams relies on statistical reasoning: it is inferred from the measured
direction of heat flow, and simply represents the most likely way for the temper-
ature of the absorbing plate to behave. But one of the lessons of our discussion
has been that statistics may be overridden by boundary conditions. Here, the
temperature is constant before the telescope is opened because our policy has
imposed this as a boundary condition. A second boundary condition is provided
by the presence of the future reverse radiation source. Hence the system is sta-
tistically constrained in both temporal directions. We should not be surprised
that it does not exhibit behaviour predicted under the supposition that in one
direction or other, it has its normal degrees of freedom. It is not clear whether
this loophole will always be available, though my suspicion is that it will be.
If nothing else, quantum indeterminism is likely to imply that it is impossi-
ble to sufficiently constrain the two boundary conditions to yield an outright
contradiction.
A consistency objection of a different kind to the Gold universe has been
raised by Hartle and Gell-Mann.44 Hartle and Gell-Mann point out that assum-
ing the present epoch is relatively ‘young’ compared to the epoch of maximum
expansion, it is to be expected that the conversion of matter to radiation in stars
will raise the ratio of the energy density of radiation to that of non-relativistic
matter considerably by the time of the corresponding epoch in the recollapsing
phase. Hartle and Gell-Mann estimate an increase by a factor of the order of
103. By symmetry the same should apply in reverse, so that at our epoch there
should be much more radiation about than is actually observed. (Indeed, the
effect should be accentuated by blue-shift due to the universe’s contraction.)
As Davies and Twamley put it, ‘By symmetry this intense starlight background
should also be present at our epoch ..., a difficulty reminiscent of Olbers’ para-
dox.’45
One thing puzzles me about this argument: if there were such additional
radiation in our region, could we detect it? After all, it is neatly arranged to
converge on its future sources, not on our eyes or instruments. Thus imagine a
reverse-source in direction +x is emitting (in its time-sense) towards a distant
point in direction -x. We stand at the origin, and look towards -x. (See Figure
3.) Do we see the light which in our time sense is travelling from -x towards
+x? No, because we are standing in the way! If we are standing at the origin
(at the relevant time) then the light emitted from the reverse-galaxy falls on
us, and never reaches what we think of as the past sky. When we look towards
-x, looking for the radiation converging on the reverse-galaxy at +x, then the
relevant part of the radiation doesn’t come from the sky in the direction -x at
all; it comes from the surface at the origin which faces +x—i.e., from the back
of our head.
The issue as to whether and to what extent the influence of the low entropy
44Reported in Davies and Twamley (1993), p. 4 in preprint.
45Davies and Twamley (1993), p. 4 in preprint.
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condition of one end of a Gold universe might be expected to be apparent at the
other is clearly an important one, if the Gold view is to be taken at all seriously.
The main lesson of these brief comments is that the issue is a great deal more
complicated than it may seem at first sight. The more general lesson is that be-
cause our ordinary (asymmetric) habits of causal and counterfactual reasoning
are intimately tied up with the thermodynamic asymmetry, we cannot assume
that they will be dependable in contexts in which this asymmetry is not univer-
sal. To give a crude example, suppose that an event B follows deterministically
from an event A. In a Gold universe we may not be able to say that if A had not
happened B would not have happened; not because there is some alternative
earlier cause waiting in the wings should A fail to materialise (as happens in
cases of pre-emption, for example), but simply because B is guaranteed by later
events.
Indeed, Figure 3 illustrates a consequence of this kind. We had a choice as
to whether to interpose our head and hence our eye at the point O. Had we
not done so, the light emitted (in the reverse time sense) by the reverse-galaxy
at +x would have reached -x, in our past. Our action thus influences the past.
Because we interpose ourselves at O, some photons are not emitted from some
surface at -x, whereas otherwise they would have been. Normally claims to
affect the past give rise to causal loops, and hence inconsistencies. But again it
doesn’t seem to me to be obvious that this will happen in this case, for reasons
similar to those in the telescope case.
These issues clearly require a great deal more thought. Let me therefore
conclude this section with two rather tentative claims. First, it has not been
shown that the reversing-universe view leads to incoherencies. And second, there
seems to be some prospect that the contents of a time-reversing future universe
might be presently observable, at least in principle.46 The methods involved
certainly look bizarre by ordinary standards; but in the end this is nothing
more than the apparent oddity of perfectly ordinary asymmetries having the
reverse of their ‘usual’ orientation. And the main lesson of this paper is that
unless we have learnt to disregard that sort of oddity, we won’t get anywhere
with the problem of explaining temporal asymmetry.
Conclusions
What then are the options and prospects for an explanation of the observed
cosmological time-asymmetry? Let us try to summarise.
It might seem that the most attractive solution would be the possibility
mentioned in our discussion of Hawking’s NBC, namely a demonstration that
46The required experiment should not be confused with a well-known test of some cosmo-
logical implications of the Wheeler- Feynman absorber theory of radiation. A prediction of
that theory was that a transmitter should not radiate at full strength in directions in which
the future universe is transparent to radiation. Partridge (1973) performed a version of this
experiment with negative result. The present discussion does not depend on the absorber
theory (which seems to me misconceived; see Price (1991)), and predicts a different result,
namely increased radiation in the direction of future reverse-sources.
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although the laws that govern the universe are temporally symmetric, the uni-
verses that they permit are mostly asymmetric—mostly such that they possess
a single temporal extremity with the ordered characteristics of what we call the
Big Bang. But it cannot be over-emphasised that the usual statistical consider-
ations do not make this solution intrinsically more likely or more plausible than
the Gold time-symmetric cosmology. With double standards disallowed, the sta-
tistical arguments concerned are simply incompatible with the hypothesis that
the Big Bang itself is explicable as anything more than a statistical fluke. So
if anything it is the Gold view which should be regarded as the more plausible
option, simply on symmetry grounds—at least in the absence of properly mo-
tivated consistency objections to time-reversing cosmologies. And failing either
of these approaches, the main option seems to be an anthropic account. True,
there is also Penrose’s view, but here the asymmetry is rather ad hoc. If we are
going to invoke an ad hoc principle, we might as well have a symmetric one, at
least in the absence of decisive objections to the Gold cosmology.
However, it should be emphasised that none of these alternatives is imme-
diately attractive. As we saw, the anthropic approach involves an enormous
ontological cost—it requires that the universe be vastly larger than what we
know as the observable universe. (If we take Penrose’s calculation as an indi-
cation of how unlikely the observed universe actually is, and assume that it is
more or less as likely as it can be, consistent with the presence of observers, then
we have an estimate of the size of this ontological cost: our universe represents
at best 1 part in 1010
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of the whole thing.) And as for the Gold universe, it
is no magic solution to the original problem, even if consistent. We still need
to explain why singularities are of low entropy. Unless it can actually be shown
that a generic gravitational singularity is of this kind, some additional bound-
ary constraint will again be required. Although in the Gold case this additional
constraint need not be time-asymmetric, it may still appear somewhat ad hoc.
As noted earlier, however, this might seem preferable to having no explanation
of what would otherwise seem such a striking physical anomaly. Explanatory
power and theoretical elegance are the traditional antidotes to apparent ad hoc-
cery. A proposal of sufficient formal merit—perhaps the original symmetric
version of Hawking’s NBC, for example—might seem a very satisfactory theo-
retical solution.
What would have to be established to avoid the need for such an additional
boundary constraint altogether? To answer this, recall that the heart of GAS
was the observation that any gravitating universe still looks like a gravitating
universe when its temporal orientation is reversed. It follows that if increasing
entropy were the inevitable result of gravitational relaxation, any gravitating
universe would look like an entropy-maximising universe from both temporal
viewpoints. It was the inconsistency between this conclusion and the observed
the low entropy Big Bang that showed us that statistical reasoning is untrust-
worthy in this cosmological context—that undercut our grounds for thinking
that gravitational relaxation inevitably or ‘normally’ produces an increase in
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entropy.
I want to close by noting that in principle there seem to be two ways to
reconcile statistics and low entropy boundary conditions. (I don’t mean to
suggest that either of these alternatives should necessarily be taken seriously; I
am simply interested in sketching the logical structure of the problem.) One way
would be to make cosmological entropy, like gravitation, a viewpoint-dependent
matter. We have already noted that in whichever temporal orientation one
regards the universe, it appears to be gravitating—i.e. subject to the influence
of an attractive gravitational force. It is therefore an orientation-dependent
matter as to which temporal extremity we take to involve the state of greatest
gravitational relaxation (or lowest gravitational potential energy). One way to
preserve a strong link between entropy and gravitation would be to suggest
that entropy is similarly frame-dependent, and hence that entropy appears to
increase monotonically from both temporal viewpoints.
The second way would be show that gravitational collapse does not naturally
lead to a high entropy singularity at all—in other words, to find within one’s
theory of gravity an argument to the effect that entropy naturally decreases in
gravitational collapse. In this connection it is interesting to note a recent paper
by Sikkima and Israel47 claiming to show that a low entropy state may indeed be
the ‘natural’ result of gravitational collapse. In one sense this seems to be just
the sort of thing that would have to be established, if the boundary conditions
are not to require an independent law. However, Sikkima and Israel do not see
the argument as supporting the time-symmetric view. For one thing, they say
that in a cyclical universe entropy will increase from cycle to cycle. So the old
puzzle would re-emerge at this level: How can such an overall asymmetry be
derived from symmetric assumptions?
The two approaches just described sought to reconcile statistical arguments
in cosmology with the low entropy Big Bang. An alternative would be to dis-
pense with the statistical considerations altogether. It might be argued that
any such appeal to statistics relies on the assumption that the system in ques-
tion has the freedom to choose its path from among a range of equally likely
futures. Perhaps the root of our dilemma simply lies in this assumption—in
the fact that the assumption is itself incompatible with the neutral atemporal
perspective we must adopt if we are to explain temporal asymmetry. That is,
perhaps we should restore the balance not by seeking a ‘natural’ endpoint in
both directions, but by curing ourselves of our lingering attachment to the idea
of natural evolution itself. Perhaps in thinking that low entropy endpoints are
anomalous we have been misled by a form of reasoning which is itself grounded
in the temporal asymmetry; hence a form of reasoning we should be prepared
to discard, in moving to an atemporal viewpoint. This would be a more radical
departure from our ordinary ways of thinking than anything contemplated in
this paper. All the same, a possible conclusion seems to be that the project
47Sikkima and Israel (1991).
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of explaining temporal asymmetry is a hopeless one, unless we are prepared to
contemplate a radical departure of some such kind.
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